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INTRODUCTION 
Parolees and those on supervised release from prison do not retain all of the constitutional 
rights possessed by free citizens.1  However, it is unclear precisely what portion of these rights 
they retain.  Most cases dealing with the topic have dealt with the privacy interests of 
probationers and parolees.  These cases have been analyzed along traditional 4th Amendment 
lines.2   
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3606,3 unless a parole officer makes a warrantless arrest of a potential 
parole violator himself, he must secure a warrant to have law enforcement officers make the 
arrest.  The warrant, issued by the supervising court, must be based on probable cause.4  Another 
statute requires that a warrant or summons be issued during the time of supervised release in 
order to retain jurisdiction over parolees for any violations that may have occurred during their 
period of parole.5  This comment will demonstrate why such warrants should be required to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that all judicial arrest warrants be issued for 
probable cause and be based on sworn or affirmed statements.6 
                                                
1 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). For the purpose of this paper, I will use the term “parolee” to 
designate former federal inmates who have been granted supervised release.  In practical terms, there are ever-fewer 
federal “paroles” – the old system of federal parole has been gradually subsumed by the system of supervised 
release.  See infra at Part I.D.  As a legal matter, the distinction has made no difference to reviewing courts.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 817 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Our cases have not distinguished between 
parolees, probationers, [or] supervised releasees for Fourth Amendment purposes”); United States v. Garcia-
Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 446 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006). 
2 See infra notes 47 - 49 and accompanying text. 
3 Hereinafter “Section 3606.” 
4 Id. 
5 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).  Hereinafter “Section 3583.” 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. (Emphasis added). 
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Federal circuit courts have come to divergent conclusions as to whether such warrants 
must comply with the oath or affirmation requirement.  The different conclusions of the various 
courts are the result of different analytical starting points.  The Ninth Circuit determined that a 
Fourth Amendment arrest warrant was required.  The Court then analyzed whether the 
petitioner’s status as a parolee abrogated traditional Fourth Amendment warrant requirements.  
The First and Fifth Circuits began their analyses with the proposition that parolees are afforded 
fewer rights.  In that context, each court inquired whether arrest warrants for parolees must 
comply with the procedural demands of the Fourth Amendment. 
 The starting point is critical because of the shifting status of the rights of parolees 
historically.  Constitutional doctrine establishes that parolees do not have the “full panoply” of 
constitutional rights and are only afforded conditional liberty dependent on their observance of 
certain specified conditions.7   Under the old system of federal parole, administrative arrest 
warrants, dubbed “warden’s warrants,” were all that were required to seize a potential parole 
violator.8  The issuance of such warrants is only subject to a general “reasonableness” review 
from courts.9  
Although mere reasonableness is the constitutional minimum requirement for the 
issuance of parolee arrest warrants, the requirement of a judicial arrest warrant has changed the 
character of parolee warrants.  General propositions regarding the nature of parolee rights should 
not change the clear nature of what is required when a warrant must be issued.  The purpose of 
this comment is not to advocate for greater rights on behalf of parolees.  The purpose is to 
expose and explain faulty legal reasoning that clouds the status of the oath or affirmation 
                                                
7 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); United States v. Sampson, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). 
8 See infra Section I.C. 
9 See infra Sections I.Error! Reference source not found., I.C.   
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requirement and the rights of parolees.  Strained constitutional and statutory interpretations serve 
only to muddy the waters of justice.  These interpretations further complicate the issue of the 
balance of power between parolees and the government.  
I. THE HISTORY OF OATHS AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE 
 In order to properly frame the constitutional issue, it is important to understand the 
historical backdrop of the oath or affirmation clause, the changing conceptions of parolee rights 
in America, and of the evolving statutory regime for regulating parolees.  The statutory federal 
parole scheme has been changed to require arrest warrants issued by judges that must be based 
on probable cause.10  These are requirements incorporated from the Fourth Amendment and 
given to parolees.   
A. History of Oaths and Affirmations in American law 
Scholars have interpreted the oath or affirmation requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution as little more than a procedural hurdle to obtaining a warrant.11  
But the concept of requiring an oath in American law did not originate as simply a way to define 
proper procedure.  The Founding-era leaders included the requirement because the act of 
swearing an oath is a check on the veracity of declarants and ensures that a preliminary 
investigation properly equipped investigators to attest to the truth under threat of penalty.12  The 
                                                
10 See infra Section III.A. 
11 See David S. Muraskin, I Swear: The History and Implications of the Fourth Amendment’s “Oath or affirmation” 
Requirement, EXPRESSO, 2010, at 2, 6-10.  Available at: http://works.bepress.com/david_muraskin/1 (noting that 
even America’s foremost textualist Constitutional scholars give no “extraneous” importance to the clause).   
12 Id. at 1.  Muraskin states:  
It was viewed (by the Founders) as inducing investigators to take special care 
during their pre-search or -seizure inquires, leading them to obtain factual 
confirmation and refuse to rely on insinuations, so that they could submit a 
warrant application to which God himself could attest to its accuracy. Because 
the judiciary could be relied upon to consistently administer the oath 
requirement, the knowledge that the oath was part of the warrant-seeking 
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concept of the “oath” originated in Anglo-Saxon law as an alternative to the “ordeals” of the 
Middle Ages.13  A sworn statement was considered comparable proof of truth as surviving a 
tortuous ordeal.14  The concept imbedded itself slowly within the common law as an independent 
check on the reliability of statements.15   
Today, federal rules continue the long-standing requirement that witnesses must swear or 
affirm to tell the truth as a prerequisite for testifying at a trial.16  The rule explains that the oath 
or affirmation requirement is designed to impress upon the witness’ conscience the duty to tell 
the truth.17  “The purpose of the Rule is to promote the cause of truth, both by impressing upon 
the mind of the witness a duty to speak only the truth and by paving the way for punishment by 
way of perjury prosecution for deliberately false testimony.”18  “What is required . . . is not 
merely a recognition on the part of the witness that there exists a legal requirement to be truthful, 
but an agreement or statement or commitment on the part of the witness personally to be 
truthful.”19  Federal courts have long recognized the utility of an oath in the context of testimony.  
“An oath or affirmation ‘is designed to ensure that the truth will be told by insuring that the 
witness or affiant will be impressed with the solemnity and importance of his words.’”20   
Despite scholarly indifference regarding the nature of the Fourth Amendment’s oath or 
affirmation requirement, American courts seem to recognize the obligation as a personal right 
                                                                                                                                                       
process would overshadow the actions of repeat players, and thus it would lead 
them to develop internal regulations to satisfy the oath’s demands.  Id. 
13 Id. at 2; See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT (2008) (describing the 
“ordeals” of the medieval legal system). 
14 Muraskin, supra note 11, at 2. 
15 For a thorough examination of the history of oaths and their importance to the Founding era, see generally 
Muraskin, supra note 11.  
16 FED. R. EVID. 603. 
17 Id. 
18 3 Federal Evidence § 6:7 (3d ed.) 
19 Id. at § 6:8. 
20 United States v. Brooks, 285 F.3d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 50 (2d  
Cir. 1977)). 
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held by individual citizens.  For example, in the case of Weeks v. United States, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “[h]is right is to be protected against the issuance of a warrant 
for his arrest, except ‘upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,’ and naming the 
person against whom it is to issue.”21  However, the oath or affirmation required at the time of a 
warrant application is not wholly a procedural right guaranteed to the subject of the warrant.  The 
oath itself is properly viewed as an ever-present, independent check on governmental power that 
exists outside the individual to be searched or seized.22  The requirement means that 
investigating officers must be sure of their allegations.  They face the potential of perjury charges 
if they fail to diligently document and corroborate their assertions.  Because of this, the 
requirement serves the dual purpose of ensuring procedural due process for individuals and 
investigatory diligence by the government.23   
B. Conceptions of Parolee Rights 
A system of supervised release “presents special needs beyond normal law enforcement 
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements . . . .  To a 
greater or lesser degree, [parolees] do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is 
entitled, but only conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special restrictions."24  
In prior times, the dominant theory was that parolees did not retain the rights of other free 
citizens because their conditional freedom was a “privilege” or “act of grace” on the part of the 
government.25  Some cases went so far as to directly equate the rights of a parolee to those of an 
                                                
21 216 F. 292, 302 (2d Cir. 1914). 
22 See Muraskin, supra note 11, at 1-2. 
23 See Muraskin, supra note 11, at 1-2, 6-10. 
24 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–74 (1987). 
25 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 Advisory Committee Notes, 1979 Amendment (refuting the rights/privileges distinction 
abolished by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972)).  See Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) 
(stating that “probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime”).  See also 
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escaped convict.26  Older federal statutes provided that judicial warrants were unnecessary to 
obtain the help of law enforcement to arrest a suspected parole violator.27  All that was required 
was an administrative “warden’s warrant.”28  Such administrative warrants have not been held to 
the normal constitutional standards.29   
This conception of federal parolee rights changed forever in 1972.  The modern view is 
that a parolee’s interest in their personal liberty is very different from that of a regular prisoner.30  
“The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails 
to live up to the parole conditions.”31  The Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer marked a 
break from older notions of the rights of parolees.32  The Court identified that: 
. . . the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many 
of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts 
a ‘grievous loss' on the parolee and often on others.  It is hardly 
useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of 
whether the parolee's liberty is a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’  By 
whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within 
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Its termination calls 
for some orderly process, however informal.33 
 Ever since the Morrissey decision, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have 
continually been amended to identify and protect an ever-increasing array of procedural rights 
                                                                                                                                                       
William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV.L.REV. 1439, 
1440-42 (1968) (outlining the fallacy of the rights/privileges distinction for parolees). 
26 Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923); Story v. Rives, 97 F.2d 182, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1938).  These cases 
were cited by the First Circuit to support their contention that warrants for the retaking of federal parolees need not 
comply with the oath or affirmation requirement of the 4th Amendment.  See infra notes 121-122 and accompanying 
text. 
27 See United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 521-22 (1st Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 11-8130, 2012 WL 82252 
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2012); United States v. Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 445-46 (5th Cir. 2006). 
28 See Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d at 521-22; Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d at 445-46. 
29 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877-78 (1987) (identifying that administrative search warrants as more 
constitutionally lenient than judicial search warrants). 
30 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972). 
31 Id. 
32 Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 Advisory Committee Notes, 1979 Amendment (outlining how Morrissey represented a 
break from the past in terms of conceptualizing the rights of parolees). 
33 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. 
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retained by parolees before their liberty can be revoked.34  For example, federal parolees are now 
afforded the right to a preliminary hearing35 where notice is given about the potential violation.36  
Parolees are informed of their right to be represented by counsel at these proceedings.37  Final 
revocation hearings are now required to be held within “a reasonable time” of the preliminary 
hearing.38  At the revocation, parolees are entitled expansive rights to confront all evidence 
against them.39   
 Federal rules outline that parolees are entitled to have counsel appointed when charged 
with a violation of their release.40  Access to prior sworn statements made by witnesses against 
the parolee is provided for.41  Parolees are provided allocution rights at revocation hearings 
consistent with regular criminal defendant’s right to be heard at sentencing.42  It is evident that 
constitutional due process rights cannot be denied parolees on the theory that parolee is “an act 
of grace” by the government.43 
Despite these guarantees, the constitutional rights of federal parolees are not equally as 
expansive as regular citizens.  This notion was rejected by the leading Supreme Court case on the 
Fourth Amendment privacy expectations of parolees in Sampson v. California.44  The Court 
stated unequivocally that “parolees are on the ‘continuum’ of state-imposed punishments” and 
                                                
34 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 Committee notes for every amendment since 1979 (continually providing for 
enhanced procedural rights for parolees during revocation proceedings).  The notes following the 1979 explicitly 
reject the notion that any freedom granted to parolees is a “privilege” rather than a “right.” 
35 Id. at Advisory Committee Notes, 1979 Amendment. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at Advisory Committee Notes, 1993 Amendments. 
42 Id. at Advisory Committee Notes, 2005 Amendments. 
43 Id. at Advisory Committee Notes, 1979 Amendments (refuting dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 
(1935)). 
44 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
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that “parolees have fewer expectation of privacy than probationers because parole is more akin to 
imprisonment than probation . . . .”45  In ruling that suspicion-less searches of parolees who 
agreed to submit to suspicion-less searches as a condition of parole were reasonable, the Court 
noted that the state “has an ‘overwhelming interest’ in supervising parolees” because they “are 
more likely to commit future criminal offenses.”46   
The Sampson holding is significant in several respects.  First, the Court used a traditional 
Fourth Amendment analysis to examine the issue.  They did not resort to finding that 
acquiescence to a parole condition by a parolee constituted automatic consent to any search of 
the parolee.47  Nor did the Court cast aside Fourth Amendment protections simply because the 
petitioner was a parolee.  Second, the court placed a heavy emphasis upon the fact that the parole 
condition of waiving privacy rights to a search was “clearly expressed” to the parolee and that he 
was “unambiguously aware” of it.48  The Court reasoned that the lessened privacy expectations 
of parolees coupled with the high interest in public safety held by law enforcement justified such 
a search as reasonable.49   
While the probable cause and warrant requirements for searches of parolees may be 
waived, there is no precedent that establishes parolees may waive their right to require probable 
cause before they are arrested.50  In fact, Federal Rules require a preliminary hearing wherein it 
is the government’s burden to establish that probable cause existed for the arrest.51  Even in the 
                                                
45 Id. at 850. 
46 Id. at 853 (internal quotation omitted). 
47 Id. at 852 n.3 (arguing that the state court had not yet passed on the issue).   
48 Id. at 852.   
49 Id. 
50 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702–03 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (“[T]he general rule [is] that every arrest, and every seizure having the essential attributes of a 
formal arrest, is unreasonable unless it is supported by probable cause.”) 
51 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(a). 
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absence of the Federal Rule, the holding of Morrissey required such a hearing in the name of due 
process to ensure probable cause to arrest and hold the parolee existed.52 
C. Administrative warrants 
Administrative warrants have a distinct place within Constitutional law.  “. . . [I]n certain 
circumstances government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme 
need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable-cause requirements as long as their searches 
meet ‘reasonable legislative or administrative standards.’”53  The framework for reviewing such 
warrants is not to examine them for probable cause.54  “Probable cause ‘in the criminal law 
sense’ is not required for issuance of an administrative warrant [], for in the administrative 
context probable cause ‘refer[s] not to a quantum of evidence, but merely to a requirement of 
reasonableness.’”55 
The Ninth Circuit has recognized the Constitutional difference between administrative 
arrest warrants for parolees and modern federally mandated judicial arrest warrants.  In Sherman 
v. United States Parole Commission, the Court dealt with the case of a serial parole absconder 
who was recaptured via a warrant issued under the old federal system of parole.56  Even though 
the defendant in the case was arrested long after the watershed changes to the federal parole 
system, the date of his original crime subjected him to the old administrative warrant 
                                                
52 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972). 
53 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).  
The Court in Griffin cites the following additional cases as examples where administrative warrants have been 
upheld as constitutional, but not subject to regular constitutional demands: New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-
703 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). 
54 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877; United States v. Lucas, 499 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 2007). 
55 Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877; Lucas, 499 F.3d at 777 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978)).  
56 502 F.3d 869, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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requirements.57  He challenged the warrant because it was not based on sworn facts as required 
by the Fourth Amendment.58  
The Court recognized that courts “ordinarily require a search or seizure to be 
‘accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.’”59  However, because 
“searches and seizures of parolees are generally not subject to the requirements of the Warrant 
Clause,” the Court concluded that the otherwise reasonable administrative warrant issued was 
constitutionally sufficient.60  “However,” the Court continued, “this doesn’t apply to judicial 
warrants – even the ninth circuit has recognized that it is that distinction that marks a 
demarcation.”61  The Court looked to the modern federal system of parole as an example of 
where a requirement for judicial warrants engrafted traditional Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirements onto revocation warrants.62  The distinction the Court drew was that they were 
“given a statute that requires ‘an administrative warrant, not a judicial warrant within the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment.’”63 
D. Federal Supervised Release After the Sentencing Reform Act 
Sections 3606 and 3583 were enacted in 1984 as part of the Sentencing Reform Act that 
transformed the federal parole system into a system of supervised release system.64  “Under the 
Sentencing Reform Act's provisions for supervised release, the sentencing court, rather than the 
Parole Commission, would oversee the defendant's postconfinement monitoring.”65  Courts do 
                                                
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 870. 
59 Id. at 883 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). 
60 Id. at 884. 
61 Id. at 885 (citing United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (citing Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 232 (1960)). 
64 United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 519 (1st Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 11-8130, 2012 WL 82252 (U.S. 
Feb. 21, 2012).   
65 Gozlon–Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1991).   
13 
 
not distinguish between the constitutional rights of parolees and those who are in a form of post-
incarceration supervised release.66  However, the modern form of supervised release is 
significantly different from the old system of federal parole in one respect:  “Supervised release 
is a form of government supervision after a term of imprisonment. Unlike parole, which has the 
effect of reducing the stated term of imprisonment, supervised release is a term of supervision in 
addition to, and following, a term of imprisonment imposed by a court.”67  The archaic logic that 
parolees retain no rights because their freedom comes from an “act of grace” by the sovereign is 
meaningless under the modern federal system.68  Each federal inmate is required to serve a term 
of supervised release after a period of incarceration.  
Section 3606 provides that a parole officer may make a warrantless arrest of his parolee 
so long as probable cause exists to believe that he has violated a term of his release. If the parole 
officer does not make the arrest himself, “[t]he court having supervision of the probationer or 
releasee, or, if there is no such court, the court last having supervision of the probationer or 
releasee, may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer or releasee . . . .”69  Any parole 
officer or United States marshal may then execute the warrant.70  Section 3583 provides that 
people who complete a term of supervised release may nonetheless be subject to revocation 
proceedings if: (1) they are arrested per a “warrant or summons,” (2) the warrant or summons is 
                                                
66 See, e.g., United States. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 817 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Our cases have not distinguished 
between parolees, probationers, [or] supervised releasees for Fourth Amendment purposes”); United States v. 
Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 446 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006). 
67 Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha & Omega of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REV. 267, 269-70 (1996). 
68 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
69 Section 3606. 
70 Id. 
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issued before expiration of a term of supervised release, and (3) on the basis of an allegation of a 
violation of supervised release.71 
II. FEDERAL APPELLATE CASES – DIVERGENT APPROACHES 
 
Are the warrants authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act truly judicial warrants within 
the purview of the Fourth Amendment?  After all, the Supreme Court has noted that 
administrative warrants “may but do not necessarily have to be issued by courts.”72  Finding that 
such warrants are actually “administrative warrants dressed as judicial warrants” would be a 
plausible excuse for finding that such warrants need not comply with the Fourth Amendment.  
The federal parole system has historically been an administrative system.73  As such, it 
historically operated in the shadow of, but not within the direct supervisory control of, the 
judiciary.74   
However, the judiciary plays a much more active role in the supervision of parolees 
under the modern federal system.75  Also, unlike other administrative warrant systems, the 
judiciary alone may issue the warrants.76  There is no remainder left to an administrative agency.  
Tellingly, another federal circuit court analyzed these warrants as constitutionally prescribed 
judicial warrants years before the issue of the oath or affirmation requirement was raised. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was the first federal circuit 
court to discuss whether the modern federal system of supervised release required warrants that 
                                                
71 Section 3583. 
72 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 (1987). 
73 See supra Sections Error! Reference source not found..B-I.C. 
74 See supra Part Error! Reference source not found.. 
75 See Gozlon–Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1991) (“Under the Sentencing Reform Act's 
provisions for supervised release, the sentencing court, rather than the Parole Commission, would oversee the 
defendant's postconfinement monitoring”).   
76 See Section 3606.  No federal circuit court has explicitly relied on this rationale in finding that such warrants need 
not comply with the oath or affirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment. 
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were subject to Fourth Amendment requirements.  In United States v. Hondras, the question 
presented was whether the arrest warrant issued for the parolee was sufficient when it was issued 
upon the order of a judge, but actually signed by one of his clerks.77  The Court stated: “The 
statute makes no mention of who must sign the warrant. We first note that no constitutional 
concern exists here. The Fourth Amendment provides that [n]o warrant shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”78  As a part of their analysis, the Court looked 
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rules 4 and 9 – the same rules that outline the 
technical requirements for all other judicially issued arrest warrants – for support.79   
The Hondras decision is likely the first federal appellate decision to conceptualize the 
technical requirements for the new kind of arrest warrants required by the system of supervised 
release.  The decision implicitly affirmed that the probable cause required by Section 3606 was 
the probable cause standard recognized for regular judicial warrants.  The Court certainly did not 
regard the warrants authorized by Section 3606 as administrative warrants whose “probable 
cause” standard has been transformed by the Supreme Court into merely a requirement of 
reasonableness.80  This reasoning was never challenged directly by either of the circuit courts 
who held that these warrants need not comply with the oath or affirmation requirement.81 
A. The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Vargas-Amaya 
The one circuit that has recognized that arrest warrants for parolees under Section 3606 
include a sworn facts requirement is the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  In 
                                                
77 296 F.3d 601, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2002). 
78 Id. at 602 (internal quotation omitted).   
79 Id. at 602-03. 
80 See supra Subsections I.Error! Reference source not found.-I.C. 
81 See infra Subsections II.B-C. 
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United States v. Vargas–Amaya,82 the court addressed the requirements of a warrant by applying 
Section 3583, the jurisdictional statute.83  The Ninth Circuit was the first federal circuit to 
address the issue. 
Instead of relying upon a dictionary definition of the term “warrant,” the Ninth Circuit 
initially acknowledged that Congress intended the word “warrant” to be a term of art.84  As such, 
“unless Congress affirmatively indicates otherwise, we presume Congress intended to 
incorporate the common definition of that term.”85  The court then detailed how the oath or 
affirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment had been used by courts since the beginning of the 
republic to invalidate warrants that had not been issued properly.86  The court identified that 
other tribunals have characterized the protection against having a warrant issued against you but 
for probable cause established by sworn facts as a “personal right.”87 
The court noted that “[t]he government does not cite to any other statute where Congress 
expressly dispensed with the probable cause or oath requirements with regard to the issuance of 
                                                
82 389 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2004). 
83 In both Vargas-Amaya and Collazo-Castro, the petitioner was challenging the jurisdiction of the court to hold a 
revocation hearing in the first place because the warrant issued for the hearing was defective.  The fact that a warrant 
is needed for such a situation is provided for in § 3606.  As such, the question when analyzing the case under either 
statute is the same: must the warrant required comply with the oath or affirmation requirement? 
84 Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d at 904: 
“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal 
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts 
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of 
learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the 
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.  In such case, absence of contrary 
direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a 
departure from them” (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 264 (2000)).  
Id. 
85 Id.   
86 Id. (citing Ex Parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 453 (1806) (“warrant of commitment was illegal, for want of 
stating some good cause certain, supported by oath ”). 
87 Id. (citing United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 475 (9th Cir.1953)). 
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warrants.”88  The court then analyzed why, by comparing Section 3583 with Section 3606, 
Congress intended for traditional Fourth Amendment protections to apply to judicial warrants for 
the arrest of parolees.89  They noted that Section 3606, which governs the arrest of current 
parolees, requires probable cause for an arrest warrant to be issued.90  They asserted that it would 
be “counter-intuitive” to thus absolve the government of a reciprocal probable cause standard for 
those who have actually completed their terms of supervised release and must be arrested under 
Section 3583.91  The Court then tied the two together:  
The only reasonable inference is that Congress was aware of the 
Fourth Amendment and incorporated its requirement that a warrant 
be based “upon probable cause” in both statutes. By extension, if 
Congress intended to incorporate the “probable cause” portion of 
the Warrant Clause in each statute, it must have also intended to 
incorporate the “Oath or affirmation” portion of the Clause.92 
The court then identified the truism that no statute may purport to undercut the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirements that warrants must be based on probable cause and include an oath 
or affirmation.93  The Ninth Circuit used this maxim to transition to the government’s argument 
that the petitioner, because he was a parolee, was subject to “lesser or no Fourth Amendment 
protections.”94  Even though it is clear that parolees retain some Fourth Amendment protections, 
the court conceded that the available case law did not address “whether a warrant for violation of 
the terms of release must comply with the Warrant Clause.”95 
                                                
88 Id.  It is evident that the government did not even attempt to argue that the warrants contemplated by Sections 
3583 and § 3606 were administrative warrants. 
89 Id. at 904-05 n.2. 
90 Id. at 905 n.2. 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  This assertion would later become a point of contention between the Ninth Circuit and the First and Fifth 
Circuits that analyzed the issue. 
93 Id. at 906.  But see Sherman v. U.S. Parole Comm., 502 F.3d 869, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2007) (coming to the opposite 
conclusion for statutorily defined “administrative warrants” as opposed to “judicial warrants”). 
94 Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d at 906. 
95 Id. at 907. 
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This is where the Ninth Circuit distinguished the “reasonableness” and “probable cause” 
portions of the Fourth Amendment with the oath or affirmation requirement.  The Ninth Circuit 
stated that “while certain searches may be permissible when there is less than probable cause, 
under the Fourth Amendment, no warrant is valid unless there is probable cause supported by 
sworn facts.”96  Thus, the oath or affirmation guarantee is fundamentally different from the 
“malleable restriction on unreasonable searches and seizures” that forms the vast majority of 
case law regarding the Fourth Amendment protections of parolees.97 
B. The Fifth Circuit: United States v. Garcia-Avalino 
The Fifth Circuit addressed this issue in United States v. Garcia–Avalino.98  The 
petitioner was arrested in March of 2003 for violating a term of his supervised release by 
pleading guilty to a felony hit-and-run offense.99  Seven months later, his probation officer 
submitted an unsworn application for the revocation of his supervised release.100  The court 
issued the arrest warrant, and then subsequently re-issued the warrant two months later when the 
probation officer submitted an amended application that included a “sworn statement” section.101  
The petitioner challenged his arrest based on the holding in Vargas-Amaya.102   
The Fifth Circuit found that there was nothing inherent within the term “warrant” that 
required sworn facts:   
Explicit oath or affirmation requirements, however, are not proof 
that there is an implicit sworn-facts requirement embedded in the 
very meaning of the word ‘warrant’ as a legal term.  If anything, 
such examples suggest the converse, i.e. that a valid warrant need 
                                                
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 444 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006). 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 444-45.   
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 445. 
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not be supported by sworn facts unless a specific statutory 
provision requires such support.”103   
The court then cited two statutes that purportedly authorize warrants without the need for sworn 
facts:  18 U.S.C. § 3148(b) and the predecessor statute to the modern Section 3606.104  The Fifth 
circuit noted that the predecessor statute to the modern Section 3606 allowed for a “warden’s 
warrant.”105  As such, these were administrative warrants, not judicial warrants.  Nevertheless, 
the Court utilized a 1937 case analyzing the administrative warrant to support the conclusion that 
no sworn facts requirement existed for the modern judicial arrest warrants.106  The court used the 
case to support the blanket proposition that such warrants do not need to comply with Fourth 
Amendment requirements.107 
Finally, the court listed an array of holdings that demonstrated the reduced constitutional 
rights of parolees and those on supervised release.108  This smattering of cases (most of which 
dealing with Sixth Amendment rights) led the court to their conclusion: “Given the relaxed 
constitutional norms that apply in revocation hearings, a warrant for the arrest of a supervised 
releasee need not comply with the Oath or affirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment.”109 
 
 
                                                
103 Id.  But see U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
104 Garcia-Avalino, 444 F.3d at 445-46.  18 U.S.C. § 3148(b) states, in pertinent part: “The attorney for the 
Government may initiate a proceeding for revocation of an order of release by filing a motion with the district court. 
A judicial officer may issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with violating a condition of release . . . .”  
For a detailed explanation as to why these statutes are unpersuasive for the cited assertion, see infra notes 133-141 
and accompanying text. 
105 Id. at 446 n.4.   
106 Id. at 446 (citing Jarman v. United States, 92 F.2d 309, 310-311 (4th Cir. 1937)). 
107 Id. (“The Jarman court, for example, held that warrants for the retaking of parolees are not true arrest warrants 
that must comport with the Fourth Amendment”). 
108 Id. at 446-47.   
109 Id. at 447.  
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C. The First Circuit: United States v. Collazo-Castro 
The First Circuit recently tackled the issue in United States v. Collazo-Castro.110  Like in 
Vargas-Amaya, the petitioner brought a claim challenging the constitutionality of his arrest 
warrant through Section 3583.111  The First Circuit began their analysis by asserting that they 
would look at the plain meaning of the term “warrant” to determine if the warrant defined under 
Section 3606 must comply with the oath or affirmation requirement of the Fourth Amendment.112  
The court opined: 
Under settled principles of statutory construction, we first look to 
whether the statutory text is plain and unambiguous . . . .  In 
conducting this analysis, we begin with the ordinary meaning of 
the terms as of the time when the statutory provision was enacted. 
To determine ordinary meaning, we may consult dictionary 
definitions, interpretations given to the same terms by judicial 
construction, and the statutory context in which the words are 
used.113 
The court found that “[t]he standard dictionary definition of the term ‘warrant’ does not include a 
requirement that a warrant be supported by an oath or affirmation.”114  They asserted that the 
Oxford English Dictionary definition for the term, rather than the Fourth Amendment, “likely 
served as the definitional backdrop” for Congress at the time they drafted the statute.115   
The government argued that the term “warrant” meant something different for those who 
were under some form of “supervision of the court.”116  In accepting this proposition, the First 
Circuit acknowledged the same two statutes that the Fifth Circuit identified in Garcia–
                                                
110 660 F.3d 516 (1st Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 11-8130, 2012 WL 82252 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012). 
111 Id. at 516-17. 
112 Id. at 519-20. 
113 Id. at 520 (internal citations omitted). 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  The First Circuit did not cite any authority for this assertion. 
116 Id. 
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Avalino.117  The court noted that while federal rules outline that a sworn facts statement is 
necessary to issue an arrest warrant, Section 3583 provides for an alternative initiation 
mechanism to revoke pretrial release – a summons.118  A summons has never been held to 
require a sworn-facts statement to be issued.119 
Additionally, the First Circuit cited to the predecessor statute to the modern Section 3606 
as support, even though they noted that the revoked statute authorized administrative warrants 
instead of judicial ones.120  The court cited older cases for the propositions that “the violation of 
a condition of parole as being, in legal effect, on the same plane as an escape from the custody of 
the warden”121 and that the rights of a potential parole violator “were analogous to those of an 
escaped convict.”122  The court continued, remarking that the “requirements contained in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that impose procedures for taking someone into custody do 
not necessarily apply to people who . . . are under court supervision as part of a criminal 
sentence” because they are already in “constructive custody.”123   Drawing on these conclusions, 
the First Circuit presumed that Congress knew that their use of the term “warrant” in the statute 
                                                
117 Id. at 520-522.  For an explanation of why such an argument is flawed, see infra notes 133-141 and 
accompanying text. 
118 Id. at 520-21. 
119 Id. at 521. This is a fair point.  However, a summons is not a warrant.  The Court failed to recognize the distinct 
differences between the intrusions upon liberty interests created by a summons and those created by an arrest 
warrant.  A summons is not operative unless it is properly served.  Also, a summons merely requires the subject to 
appear in court at a specified time or face the issuance of a bench warrant.  On the other hand, an arrest warrant 
allows authorizes authorities to immediately detain the subject of the warrant and restrict their liberty.  It is these 
distinctions that may have prompted the concern of the Founding era leaders to craft the Fourth Amendment they 
way that they did.  In either case, the Constitutional demands of a warrant are inapposite when discussing judicial 
summons.  As such, the persuasive power of twinning the technical requirements of the two is de minimus. 
120 Id. at 521-22. 
121 Id. at 521 (quoting Story v. Rives, 97 F.2d 182, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1938)). 
122 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923)). 
123 Id. (quoting United States v. Presley, 487 F.3d 1346, 1349 (2007).  A discussion of why the authority the First 
Circuit relies upon is unpersuasive is contained infra at notes 166-171 and accompanying text. 
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did not import by reference the Fourth Amendment’s requirements, and that “its failure to 
engraft such a requirement onto section 3606 speaks volumes.”124   
After coming to the conclusion that such a warrant was not a “Fourth Amendment” 
warrant, the court quickly disposed of the petitioner’s additional claim: that the Fourth 
Amendment itself rendered whatever warrant was issued invalid.  After noting that parolees are 
not subject to the “full panoply” of rights, the First Circuit found this right was not one of the 
remainder retained by those on supervised release.125  The court figured that such a sworn-facts 
requirement shouldn’t be necessary “[b]ecause a probation officer's credibility is typically known 
by the district court, and because she is an officer of the court, an oath or affirmation is not 
required either to ensure credibility or to impress the officer with the consequences of failing to 
tell the truth.”126 
III. WHY ARREST WARRANTS FOR FEDERAL PAROLEES MUST COMPLY WITH THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT’S OATH OR AFFIRMATION CLAUSE 
Until the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Garcia-Avalino, every federal circuit court that 
analyzed federal parolee arrest warrants required after the Sentencing Reform Act found 
traditional Fourth Amendment requirements were applicable.127  However, the Fifth and First 
United States Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have found that the general nature of the rights of 
parolees abrogates the constitutional oath or affirmation guarantee even when a warrant is 
required.  The legal reasoning of the Fifth and First Circuits is circuitous and flawed.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s approach is superior. 
 
                                                
124 Id. at 522. 
125 Id. at 523. 
126 Id. 
127 See supra Sections II-II.A. 
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A. Warrants for Parolees are Subject to Fourth Amendment Requirements 
 The Vargas-Amaya decision, being handed down first and interpreted by the other circuit 
courts, laid out an analytical framework for determining whether warrants issued under the 
Sentencing Reform Act must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s oath or affirmation 
clause.128  The court ruled that they did, stating: 
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated 
the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it 
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were 
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from 
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the 
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.  In such case, absence of 
contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely 
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.129 
Implicit in the court’s reasoning is that the analysis begins with a determination of what 
kind of warrant is required.  Unlike the other circuit courts, the Vargas-Amaya court did not 
begin the analysis by inquiring what is required of a parolee warrant.  The Vargas-Amaya court 
began their inquiry by asking what kind of warrant is required in the first place.  Beginning with 
the outdated notion that parolee warrants are inherently different than other warrants makes the 
entire analytical process artificial.  By starting their analysis at a different place, the other circuit 
courts ensured that their analysis would lead them to at a different conclusion.  But it is the 
Vargas-Amaya court that started by asking, essentially, what the Constitution demands of 
judicial warrants generally.  
In Garcia-Avalino, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit managed to 
reach the opposite conclusion.  They pointed out that expressed statutory requirements for 
warrants to include a sworn-facts requirements tend to demonstrate that, in general, warrants 
                                                
128 United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2004). 
129 Id. (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 264 (2000)). 
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need no sworn facts requirement.130  Such an analysis completely ignores that the Fourth 
Amendment explicitly requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation.”131  This is certainly true of judicial warrants.  The Fifth Circuit does not 
adequately explain why the traditional rule should not initially apply to this situation. 
Instead of relying only on a parsing of the team “warrant” to refute the contention of the 
Vargas-Amaya court, the Fifth Circuit identified two statutes that authorize the issuance of 
warrants that do not require sworn facts.132  The court believed that this would distinguish their 
cases because no examples were provided by the government in Vargas-Amaya that abrogated 
such requirements for judicial warrants.133  However, statutes cited by the Fifth Circuit are easily 
distinguishable from the case at hand. 
 The first statute cited by the Fifth Circuit, 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b), deals with the revocation 
of pre-trial release based on a possible violation of a condition of pretrial release.  It reads, in 
pertinent part, “[t]he attorney for the Government may initiate a proceeding for revocation of an 
order of release by filing a motion with the district court.  A judicial officer may issue a warrant 
for the arrest of a person charged with violating a condition of release . . . .”134  The cited statute 
does not identify whether or not a sworn-facts requirement exists at all.  The statute does not 
explicitly relieve government attorneys from their duty to attest to the truthfulness of statements 
they make to the court.135  There is no indication whether the government attorney may thereafter 
be required to swear as a part of the process for the issuance of the warrant.  Nor does the statute 
                                                
130 United States. v. Garcia–Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 445 (5th Cir. 2006). 
131 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
132 Garcia–Avalino, 444 F.3d at 445-46. 
133 Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d at 904. 
134 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b). 
135 Id. 
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bind the Court’s discretion to issue the warrant.136  In fact, the statute does not squarely deal with 
the issuance of a warrant at all.  It merely regulates the initiation of proceedings for pre-trial 
release.137  As such, this statutory scheme simply recognizes the court’s inherent power to set 
and determine conditions of bond and pre-trial release.  Motion practice, rather than the warrant 
process, is generally the vehicle used to initiate such proceedings. 
The second statute cited by the Fifth Circuit was the prior version of today’s Section 
3606.138  The court then used the old version of the statue, and cases interpreting it, to argue 
against the express terms of Section 3606.139  Most egregiously, the court’s rationale ignored the 
most critical difference between the old and new statutes: that the legislature changed a statute 
requiring merely an administrative warrant to a statute requiring a judicial warrant.  The same 
kind of constitutional distinction that is drawn between administrative and judicial search 
warrants applies to arrest warrants as well.140   If any inference is to be drawn from this change, 
it is that Congress chose to abrogate administrative warrants in this situation in favor of judicial 
ones.  The analysis of the older cases also ignores the watershed change in how the rights of 
parolees are conceived after 1972.141 
The First Circuit reached their conclusion using an alternative form of analysis to avoid 
the problem created by a judicial arrest warrant that failed to comply with Fourth Amendment 
                                                
136 Id. (“A judicial officer may issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with violating a condition of release 
. . .”) (emphasis added).  
137 Id. 
138 United States. v. Garcia–Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 445 (5th Cir. 2006).  This statute, the now repealed 18 U.S.C. § 
717 (1934), stated in pertinent part: 
If the warden of the prison . . . from which the prisoner was paroled or the Board 
of Parole or any member thereof shall have reliable information that the prisoner 
has violated his parole, then said warden, at any time within the term or terms of 
the prisoner's sentence may issue his warrant to any officer hereinafter 
authorized to execute the same for retaking of such prisoner. 
139 Garcia–Avalino, 444 F.3d at 445-46. 
140 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958). 
141 See supra Section I.B. 
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standards.  The court’s initial proposition is questionable – that Congress, in drafting Section 
3606, relied on the dictionary definition of the term “warrant” rather than “the meaning its use 
will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”142  But to do so ignores that, as the 
Vargas-Amaya court stated:  
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated 
the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it 
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were 
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from 
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the 
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.  In such case, absence of 
contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely 
accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.143 
The accumulated legal tradition of the term warrant clearly requires something more than the 
dictionary definition.  Nobody doubts the proposition that, as a general matter, judicial arrest 
warrants must comply with the Fourth Amendment.  As such, it is simply doubtful that the 
dictionary definition of warrant “likely served as the definitional backdrop” when Congress 
drafted the Sentencing Reform Act.144 
In support of this proposition, the First Circuit identified cases interpreting administrative 
warrants for the arrest of parolees.145  The court used the language of older cases to support the 
notion that the meaning of the term “warrant” stayed the same despite the significant revisions to 
the applicable statute, the federal system of supervised release, and judicial recognition of the 
rights of federal parolees.146  This position is unsupportable for the same reasons it was improper 
                                                
142 United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 520 (1st Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 11-8130, 2012 WL 82252 (U.S. 
Feb. 21, 2012). 
143 United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 2004). 
144 Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d at 520. 
145 Id. at 521-22. 
146 Id.; See supra Part I.B. 
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in Garcia-Avalino.147  If Congress had intended to remove traditional Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirements for the arrest of potential parole violators, they could have left the statute 
alone.  Instead, they modified the system.  This change is glossed over by the Collazo-Castro 
court without adequate explanation or analysis. 
The change in nature of arrest warrants for parolees cannot be ignored.  Along with 
continual recognition of more rights retained by parolees in revocation proceedings over the 
years,148 Congress provided that, when an arrest warrant is needed for the return of a parolee, it is 
“[t]he court” who is authorized to issue the warrant.149  There is no remainder left for the 
possibility of an administrative body stepping in.  The Supreme Court has been clear on the 
procedural requirements between administrative and judicial search warrants:  
The Constitution prescribes . . . that where the matter is of such a 
nature as to require a judicial warrant, it is also of such a nature as 
to require probable cause.  Although we have arguably come to 
permit an exception to that prescription for administrative search 
warrants, which may but do not necessarily have to be issued by 
courts, we have never done so for constitutionally mandated 
judicial warrants.  There it remains true that ‘[i]f a search warrant 
be constitutionally required, the requirement cannot be flexibly 
interpreted to dispense with the rigorous constitutional restrictions 
for its issue.’150   
The same kind of constitutional distinction that is drawn between administrative and judicial 
search warrants applies to arrest warrants as well.151    
 
 
                                                
147 See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text. 
149 Section 3606. 
150 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877-78 (1987) (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959)).   
151 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958). 
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B. Status as a Parolee Does not Absolve the Government’s Burden of the Oath or 
Affirmation Requirement 
 After determining that the regular Fourth Amendment standards attached to judicial arrest 
warrants issued for federal parolees, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the status of a federal 
parolee abrogates the normal constitutional warrant requirements.152  Once again, the starting 
point for their analysis was crucial.  The critical question is whether these parolees are presumed 
to have the right in the first place.  But this question can only be analyzed when looking at the 
bigger picture.  It would be insufficient to analyze the rights of these parolees in the vacuum of 
history and ignore the modern context.    
The Ninth Circuit distinguished between the different clauses of the Fourth Amendment 
to try and decipher whether the oath or affirmation requirement was one of the rights out of the 
“panoply” retained by federal parolees.153  The court held that “while certain searches may be 
permissible when there is less than probable cause, under the Fourth Amendment, no warrant is 
valid unless there is probable cause supported by sworn facts.”154  Thus, the oath or affirmation 
guarantee is fundamentally different from the “malleable restriction on unreasonable searches 
and seizures” that forms the vast majority of case law regarding the Fourth Amendment 
protections of parolees.155   
This view of the oath or affirmation requirement fits within the overall construction of the 
rights of federal parolees and the purpose of the oath or affirmation requirement.  It makes sense 
that we limit the privacy rights of federal parolees because of their enhanced proclivity for crime 
                                                
152 United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2004). 
153 Id. at 907. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
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and necessity of close monitoring.156  An accommodation to this necessity is provided within 
Section 3606.  The statute provides that probation officers may always make an arrest of their 
supervisee with probable cause and without the need for a warrant.157  However, the balance 
struck by the statute between the individual rights of parolees and the necessity of close 
monitoring respects the essence of the Supreme Court’s holding in Morrissey v. Brewer.158  The 
key principle outlined in Brewer is that “the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes 
many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss' on the 
parolee and often on others.”159 
The ruling that the status of one as a federal parolee does not remove this right wholesale 
respects the dual nature of the right as a protection against unjustified governmental intrusion 
and a “quality control mechanism” for preliminary government investigations.160  There is no 
governmental interest in having investigating officers lie or perform slip-shod preliminary 
investigations.  The oath or affirmation requirement is one check against this.  This 
constitutionally prescribed procedure does not unduly burden the legitimate governmental 
interests of efficient and effective policing. 
It is telling that no court has asserted that necessitating an oath or affirmation for an 
otherwise already mandatory warrant would unduly burden the government or endanger the 
public.  The traditional concerns about community safety seemed to be nullified by the 
Congressional directive that a judicial warrant be obtained before recapture.  Additionally, no 
                                                
156 For expansive discussions outlining why federal parolees have less of an interest in their privacy rights, and one 
that the community would be less willing to regard as reasonable, see Sampson v. United States, 547 U.S. 843, 850-
53 (2006); supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
157 Section 3606. 
158 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
159 Id. at 481. 
160 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. 
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court has argued that the added use of “stock” language to a warrant requirement reflects an 
onerous administrative burden on behalf of an investigating affiant.  Indeed, the Collazo-Castro 
court noted that “. . . it is now considered a best practice to seek a revocation warrant based on 
sworn facts . . . .”161  The Court even noted that the form used for such warrants had recently 
been amended to include the phrase “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 
and correct.”162  Given this backdrop, it is curious why circuit courts have been so eager to 
dispense with the right. 
It is insufficient to assert, as the Fifth Circuit did, that “[g]iven the relaxed constitutional 
norms that apply in revocation hearings, a warrant for the arrest of a supervised releasee need not 
comply with the Oath or affirmation clause of the Fourth Amendment.”163  This analysis could 
be used to support the denial of any constitutional right of parolees.  If no effort is made to define 
what marks the division between rights retained by parolees and rights lost by their status, courts 
will forever be able to argue: “parolees have rights, but this isn’t one of them.”  Additionally, the 
act of obtaining an arrest warrant is fundamentally different from “the relaxed constitutional 
norms that apply in revocation hearings.”164  The procedural norms for obtaining a warrant are 
explicitly outlined in the Fourth Amendment.  They are non-negotiable when a judicial warrant 
is required.165 
The approach of the First Circuit is unpersuasive.  They noted that “requirements 
contained in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that impose procedures for taking someone 
into custody do not necessarily apply to people who . . . are under court supervision as part of a 
                                                
161 United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 523 (1st Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 11-8130, 2012 WL 82252 (U.S. 
Feb. 21, 2012). 
162 Id. at 523 n.4.   
163 United States. v. Garcia–Avalino, 444 F.3d 444, 447 (5th Cir. 2006).   
164 Id. 
165 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877-78 (1987). 
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criminal sentence.”166  In support of this notion, the court cited several cases.167  In the cited 
Harrison case, the court relied on the outdated and conclusory comparison of “the status of a 
parole violator to that of an escaped prisoner.”168  The court in Harrison parsed out the McNabb-
Mallory exclusionary rule for when arrestees are not promptly taken before a magistrate.169  The 
Brown case dealt with the technical issue of whether parolees were “in constructive custody” for 
the purpose of federal habeas pleadings.170   
Both cases are easily distinguishable from the issue at hand.  It is simply doubtful that 
Harrison remains viable law for the cited proposition.  While the Brown case deals nominally 
with whether a parolee is “in custody” for procedural appellate purposes, it tells us little about 
the liberty interests of the parolee in general and under what rationale they are restricted.  Most 
importantly, however, while both cases address federal rules that ostensibly touch on 
constitutional issues, neither case addresses an explicit constitutional guarantee such as the oath 
or affirmation requirement.  Explicit constitutional requirements are easily distinguished from 
case law interpreting more “malleable” constitutional demands.171  These “malleable” portions of 
the Constitution are where the rights of free citizens and parolees diverge.  As such, the 
persuasive power of these cases should be limited accordingly. 
Given the sea change that occurred regarding the rights of parolees and the fact that 
Congress expressly altered the parolee arrest warrant statute to require judicially issued warrants, 
it is remarkable that the First Circuit found that Congress’ “failure to engraft [a sworn facts] 
                                                
166 Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d at 521. 
167 United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Brown, 117 F.3d 471, 475 (11th 
Cir. 1997). 
168 Harrison, 461 F.2d at 1130.  For an explanation why this law is no longer applicable, see supra notes 30-43 and 
accompanying text. 
169 Harrison, 461 F.2d at 1130. 
170 Brown, 117 F.3d 471 at 475. 
171 United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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requirement onto section 3606 speaks volumes.”172  Equally remarkable was their conclusion 
that Congress knew that their use of the term “warrant” failed to incorporate traditional Fourth 
Amendment guarantees when the First Circuit failed to identify a single statute where Congress 
had actually removed such guarantees from an otherwise validly issued judicial warrant.173  
Additionally, the First Circuit identified no congressional language stating that the Fourth 
Amendment protections were presumptively denied to parolees or those on supervised release.174 
 It is unclear why the First Circuit felt the need to elaborate further as to why such 
warrants need not comply with the oath or affirmation requirement.  However, the Collazo-
Castro court argued that parole officers need not swear an oath because, as trusted “officer[s] of 
the court,” the importance of telling the truth need not be impressed upon them.175  This analysis 
perverts constitutional protections.  If the Fourth Amendment explicitly prescribes something, it 
doesn’t matter how trustworthy the court feels a person is.  But the very notion that the Court 
would make such an argument undercuts the fundamental purposes of the oath or affirmation 
requirement – checks on the potentially coercive power of government and an independent 
assurance of the veracity of accusations that lead to the loss of individual liberty.176   
A judge cannot look into the conscience of an investigator and determine that an oath 
would have had no effect on their commitment to tell the truth.  This is true notwithstanding how 
trustworthy the judge believes the affiant to be.  From a historical standpoint, it is impossible to 
imagine that the authors of the Fourth Amendment would have acquiesced to judges relieving 
                                                
172 United States v. Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d 516, 522 (1st Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 11-8130, 2012 WL 82252 (U.S. 
Feb. 21, 2012). 
173 Id. at 521-22. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 523. 
176 See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text. 
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government officials of such procedural burdens for the sake of efficiency.177  Enshrining the 
oath or affirmation clause within the Constitution ensured that it cannot be contextualized away 
in this manner. 
The case cited by the First Circuit to support their proposition is easily distinguishable.178  
United States v. York dealt with whether it was proper for the court to delegate certain tasks to 
parole officers that constituted supervisory authority.179  Supervisory authority over parolees is 
the entire reason we have parole officers in the first place.  Nowhere in the case is it hinted that 
parole officers need not comply with otherwise express constitutional commands because of their 
“trusted status” before the tribunal. 
Why should the parole officer, with a potentially acrimonious relationship with a parolee, 
be given a presumption of trustworthiness when courts have repeatedly acknowledged how the 
“competitive nature of ferreting out crime” may lead police to stretch the truth?180  The First 
Circuit seems to ignore that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive 
officers of the Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility 
are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute.”181  Even though a parole officer’s 
                                                
177 For a good overview of why the Founding-era leaders would be very wary of relieving procedural warrant 
requirements, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608-10 (1980). 
178 Collazo-Castro, 660 F.3d at 523. 
179 357 F.3d 14, 22 n. 6 (1st Cir.2004). 
180 See Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948):  
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring 
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime. 
181 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972). 
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functions may extend beyond these traditional police powers, their general supervisory duties 
transform upon their belief that their supervisee has violated a term of their release.182   
Additionally, there is no principled reason why parole officers, bailiffs, attorneys, 
magistrates or other judges need to swear an oath before testifying under the formulation of the 
First Circuit.  This is because they are likewise “officers of the court” whose trustworthiness is 
known to the presiding judge.  Tellingly, the First Circuit does not delve into this logical 
extension of their holding. 
CONCLUSION 
 The nature of the rights of federal parolees has changed greatly over the past forty years.  
Where once potential parole violators were accorded the same rights as prison escapees, courts 
now recognize the distinct liberty interest maintained by those on supervised release.  The 
modern federal supervised release scheme reflects of the over-arching movement towards a 
broader recognition of the rights retained by federal parolees.   
As history has demonstrated, the rights of parolees are not absolute.  However, courts 
reviewing the Sentencing Reform Act have a duty to interpret this statutory scheme under 
accepted methods constitutional and statutory interpretation.  By denying the right to federal 
parolees to have their arrest warrants sworn to by investigating officers, these courts have further 
complicated the field of constitutional analysis and abrogated the government’s responsibility to 
act responsibly without a countervailing societal benefit. 
                                                
182 See Section 3606 (parole officers may arrest their supervisees upon probable cause of a violation of the terms of 
their release). 
